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A NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRECURSOR OF BROWN V
BOARD OF EDUCATION THE TRIAL COURT
OPINION IN THE KANSAS SCHOOL
SEGREGATION CASE OF 1881
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The transition from slavery to freedom plainly required more than
abolition, but the extent of that further step-what the Fourteenth
Amendment means, or ought to mean, on matters of race-was left de-
liberately vague in 1866 and has been controversial ever since. One obvi-
ous question, whether the remade Constitution prohibited state laws
requiring racial segregation, did not reach the United States Supreme
Court until Plessy v. Ferguson I in 1896. By that time the question was no
longer new. The argument against legally imposed segregation, based
initially on state-law grounds, had been developing since the 1840s in two
parallel lines of cases, one involving public schools, the other railroad
and steamboat accommodations. With the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, the antisegregation argument took on a federal con-
stitutional dimension. Thereafter, the case against state-sponsored segre-
gation in either setting typically included an assertion that laws requiring
the separation of the races constituted a denial of equal protection. 2
Although the nineteenth-century opponents of segregation won a
number of significant legal victories, the constitutional argument based
on the Fourteenth Amendment was notoriously unsuccessful. Courts up-
holding Jim Crow laws naturally held that the equal protection clause
imposed no bar to segregation: they denied that "equality" meant "iden-
tity," and they pointed to the widespread practice of segregation in
northern states and the District of Columbia as evidence that the country
at large shared their understanding. 3 That the judicial defenders of seg-
regation should take this view of the Fourteenth Amendment was only
predictable. More disconcerting to modem observers has been the strik-
ing fact that nineteenth-century courts overturning legal segregation in
schools or transportation elected for the most part to rest their decisions
on common law or statutory requirements, scarcely alluding to the new
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION chs. 2-6 (1992).
3. Representative decisions on these points included State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio
St. 198 (1871), and Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874).
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constitutional command that might have been thought to offer a more
attractive ground of decision.
The most comprehensive study of the nineteenth-century school seg-
regation decisions identifies only one published judicial opinion-an ob-
scure decision of a county court in Pennsylvania-asserting federal
constitutional grounds to support a holding that segregated schools were
illegal.4 Much better known, and much more representative of the
antisegregation decisions, is the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court in
Board of Education v. Tinnon.5 By a 2-1 vote, over the angry dissent of
future United States Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer, the Kansas
court ruled that the city of Ottawa, Kansas had no legal authority "to
establish separate schools for white and colored children, and to exclude
colored children from the schools established for white children for no
other reason than that they are colored children."' 6 But the opinion by
Justice Daniel M. Valentine based the court's decision exclusively on a
technical argument about the extent of municipal authority under the
Kansas school statutes. After referring, sympathetically and at some
length, to a possible constitutional ground of decision in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Valentine pointedly declined to rely on it:
The question whether the legislatures of states have the power to
pass laws making distinctions between white and colored citizens, and
the extent of such power, if it exists, is a question which can finally be
determined only by the supreme court of the United States; and hence
we pass this question, and proceed to the next, over which we have
more complete jurisdiction. 7
Even those judges, like Valentine, most receptive to an expansive inter-
pretation of the new federal guarantee of racial equality appeared some-
times to doubt the substance of the constitutional promise.
The judge who originally tried the case, N. T. Stephens of the
Franklin County District Court, had written a more confident opinion.
That opinion, however, took him where the state supreme court was un-
willing to follow.
The Ottawa School Board announced in the fall of 1880 that, after a
4. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY
LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS 21-22 (1986). The published opinion ex-
plaining an antisegregation decision on constitutional grounds is Commonwealth ex rel. Allen v.
Davis, 10 Weekly Notes of Cases 156 (C.P. Crawford County, Pa. 1881), "less an important prece-
dent than a straw in a brief but strong anti-racist wind." KOUSSER, supra at 22. The case would
certainly be unknown today were it not for Professor Kousser's discovery. Allen v. Davis lost its
immediate significance when Pennsylvania amended its statutes to prohibit segregated schools. The
decision was never appealed to a higher court, and the opinion quickly dropped from view.
5. Board of Educ. of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. I (1881).
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 68:1199
PRECURSOR OF BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION
lapse of several years, it was reestablishing a separate "colored school"
for children in the elementary grades. A group of militant black parents
determined to challenge the decision in court. Elijah Tinnon, who had
been part of a successful effort to desegregate Ottawa's schools as re-
cently as 1876, brought suit on behalf of his son Leslie against the school
board and its superintendent, William Wheeler, to compel Leslie's ad-
mission to the classes in the main school building.8 On January 18, 1881,
Judge Stephens issued an order directing that Leslie Tinnon be admitted
to the regular public school. The school board, according to Judge Ste-
phens, lacked the authority to conduct a racially segregated school-not
because of any inadequacy of the Kansas statutes, which (as Stephens
expressly found) gave the board plenary authority, but because the Four-
teenth Amendment forbade the practice.
The district court opinion in Tinnon v. Wheeler is the earliest dis-
coverable judicial statement that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
legal segregation of public schools. With a single exception already
noted,9 it was the only such holding in the nineteenth century. The opin-
ion is important for its substance as well. Judge Stephens squarely con-
fronted the "separate but equal" argument that necessarily underlay the
legal defense of segregation, offering a response that made effective use of
Supreme Court precedent (Railroad Co. v. Brown 10 in particular) and
that anticipated, in spirit and approach, some passages of Justice John
Marshall Harlan's dissenting opinion in Plessy."1 Because the opinion
was published only in local newspapers, and because the Kansas
Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment, did not refer to the lower
court opinion, a significant piece of legal history has been heretofore
unknown.
Nelson Timothy Stephens, the author of the district court opinion,
was born in upstate New York on November 2, 1820. From the age of
twenty-four he practiced law in Moravia, N.Y., a small town midway
between Ithaca and Auburn. When Abraham Lincoln summoned the
Congress and called up state militias on April 15, 1861, Stephens locked
his law office and marched off to war at the head of a troop of volunteers
8. For the background of the school segregation controversy in Ottawa, and the limited effect
of the judicial decisions of 1881 outlawing segregation, see KULL, supra note 2, at 100-07.
9. See supra note 4.
10. Washington, A. & G. R.R. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
11. Compare Stephens' exasperated concluding observation in Tinnon v. Wheeler ("It is evident
as to the purpose of the rule.") with Harlan's well-known remarks about the purpose of Louisiana's
separate car law: "The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for
whites and blacks to compel the latter to keep to themselves .... No one would be so wanting in
candor as to assert the contrary." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557.
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from Moravia. Invalided some five months later, Captain Stephens re-
turned to law practice in Auburn, where he was troubled with lingering
ill health; eventually he gave up his profession and moved west with his
wife and family, settling in Lawrence, Kansas in 1868. After spending a
number of years in semiretirement as a gentleman farmer, Stephens was
drawn back into law practice, representing Kansas municipalities in liti-
gation over the most controversial issue of the day, the repudiation of
"railroad aid" municipal bonds. Stephens was elected District Judge of
Franklin County on the Republican ticket in 1876; he served in that of-
fice from January 1877 until his death on December 29, 1884.12
Andrew Kull
Associate Professor
School of Law, Emory University
12. These notes on Judge Stephens' career are drawn from a memorial by his daughter, the
classicist and author Kate Stephens, published in 14 KANSAS HIST. COLLECTIONs 23, 23-58 (1918).
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THE SCHOOL QUESTION. 3
JUDGE STEPHENS' DECISION.
Leslie Tinnore vs. W heeler, et al.
The city of Ottawa, in this State, is a city known under the Statutes
as a city of the second class. It has within its limits a large class of chil-
dren of school age who are children of free white parents, also a far less
number of children of school age who are children of African descent,
known as Negroes.
The Board of Education of said city have provided rooms and teach-
ers for the education of the free white children, and they have also pro-
vided for the free education of said colored children, separate and apart
from said white children, rooms and teachers in every respect equal to
those furnished said white children; but said colored children are not
allowed to attend the schools provided for white children, nor are said
white children allowed to attend the colored children's school.
The relator, a child of school age, of African descent, a resident
within said city, and entitled to attend school as a scholar therein,
presented himself at the school provided for white children and de-
manded admittance thereunto, and leave to attend as a scholar, but was
refused on the grounds that he was a person of African descent and that
a rule of the Board of Education prohibited his admission for that reason.
He now asks the mandatory writ of this court to compel such admission.
The Statute provides (Gen'l Statutes, page 846, section 151):
In each city governed by this act there shall be established and
maintained a system of free common schools, which shall be kept open
not less than three, nor more than ten months in any one year, and
shall be free to all children residing in such city between the ages of five
and twenty-one years. But the Board of Education may, when school-
room accommodations are insufficient, exclude for the time being, chil-
dren between the ages of five and seven years.
Sec 158, Gen'l Stat., p. 847.-
The Board of Education shall have power to elect their own officers,
except the treasurer; to make their own rules and regulations, subject
to the provisions of this article, to organize and maintain a system of
graded schools; to establish a high school whenever in their opinion
13. The following text is transcribed from The School Question - Judge Stephens' Decision,
DAILY REPUBLICAN (Ottawa, Kan.), Jan. 19, 1881, at 2. (The opinion was reprinted in the paper's
weekly edition the following day.) For greater legibility, the longer extracts in the opinion have been
set off as block quotations. No other alterations have been made to the text, and its typographical
errors have been left uncorrected. Obvious errors in the newspaper report include the name of the
plaintiff (Tinnore for Tinnon) and the misspelled citations to Strauder v. West Virginia.
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the educational interests of the city demands the same, and to exercise
the sole control of the schools and school property of the city.
These sections are all the laws of the State necessary to cite to show
the State policy in reference to the subject matter of inquiry. They pro-
vide for a system of free schools and in cities of the second class give to
the Board of Education plenary power over them. They can organize a
system of graded schools, establish a high school, and exercise sole con-
trol over the schools and school property. This, it seems to me confers a
power broad enough to authorize the action of the School Board com-
plained of in this case, and were there no other questions to be considered
the case might be here dismissed.
It is alleged that the order of the School Board prohibiting the
colored children from attending the school where white children are
taught is in contravention of the true intent and meaning of the 14th
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and is therefore
void. And it is further contended that as there is organized a system of
free schools for all children of school age, that all children have of right
the privilege of enjoyment thereof, as well for the instruction to be ob-
tained from the teachers as for the benefits to be obtained from social
intercourse and example set by those brought up in a more refined
manner.
This latter consideration may be dismissed with the simple remark
that no one ought to have the right, even for the great purpose of public
education, to thrust his own vulgarity upon and compel its association
with people of better manners; and children virtuously brought up ought
to have the right of exemption from contaminating influences, let them
come from whatever source they may.
The other question, as to the effect of the 14th Constitutional
Amendment upon the order of the School Board, is a question of far
graver import. That amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States, and of the
state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce laws which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
This provision of the Constitution received an interpretation in the
cases known as the Slaughter-House cases, 16 Wallace 36, and also in the
case of Strander vs. West Virginia, 10 Otto 303.
In the first mentioned case, Judge Bradley, in a dissenting opinion,
uses this language:
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A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to
and reside in any state he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein and
an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of
the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right. He is not bound to
cringe to any superior, or to pray for any act of grace as a means of
enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. * * * If
a man be denied full equality before the law he is denied one of the
essential rights of citizenship as a citizen of the United States.
Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion of the court said: "We
doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes, as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision."
In Strander vs. West Virginia, the following language was used by
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Strong:
It (the 14th amendment) ordains that no State shall make or en-
force any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, (evidently referring to the newly-made
citizens who, being citizens of the United States, are declared to be also
citizens of the State in which they reside.) It ordains that no State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States; and in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against them by law because of their color. The words of the
amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity or right most valuable to the
colored race. The right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them, distinctively as colored: Exemption from legal discrimi-
nations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of
their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations
which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.
In Railroad Co. v. Brown-17 Howard, U. S. 445-the court held
that in an enactment granting certain privileges to a railroad company it
was provided that no person shall be excluded from the cars on account
of color; that this meant that persons of color should travel in the same
cars that white ones did, and along with them in such cars, and that the
enactment was not satisfied by the company's providing cars assigned
exclusively to people of color, though they were as good as those which
they assigned exclusively for white persons, and in fact were the very cars
which were at certain times assigned exclusively to white persons. That
discriminations on account of celor must cease, and the colored and
white race in the use of cars be placed on an equality."
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In the case at bar the School Board of the city of Ottawa have en-
acted a rule within the letter of the authority given them by the State law;
that rule is the legislation of which the relator complains. It is a rule
plainly discriminating against the relator on account of his race or color,
pointing out himself and others of his class, by reason of their color, as
not being eligible to school privileges with white children.
It is no answer to the proposition to say that white children are
excluded from the African school room. It is evident as to the purpose of
the rule. Under the construction the Supreme Court of the United States
has put upon the 14th amendment of the constitution it is evident to
every mind that the Legislature of the State of Kansas had no power to
confer authority upon the School Board of the city of Ottawa to make
the order complained of. The rule itself is a violation of the rights con-
ferred by the 14th amendment, and is inoperative and void.
It follows that a peremtory writ must issue in this case pursuant to a
prayer therefor. No costs will be given either party.
